is no apologist for the sneak attack. Rather he objectively analyzes recently released empirical evidence that reveals the individuals truly responsible for delaying lawful notice to the United States about the coming attack. The fault did not rest with the embassy staff, as portrayed to the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, but with a conspiracy to cover up facts, a conspiracy that is now traceable to high-level officials who deliberately delayed Foreign Ministry telegrams. Moreover, the Japanese notes delivered to then-secretary of state Cordell Hull shortly after the attack were not declaration-of-war ultimatums as required by international law but watereddown notices about the termination of bilateral negotiations. The unmistakable conclusion from the evidence is that the officials in power wanted to catch the Americans off guard.
Iguchi writes from firsthand experience and with convincing passion about those in Japan who even now do not want to accept responsibility for their country's perfidious actions. He cites authoritatively from official, insider records, not only placing blame where it belongs but also clearing up the record to allow closure, moving to more open and honest U.S.-Japanese relations.
The book provides a detailed time-line context for the foreign policy pursued by Japan throughout 1940-41, when the focus of the Japanese military was on China and the Soviet Union. Iguchi rejects the thesis that American economic sanctions and demands for a complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from China forced Japan into war. Iguchi identifies powerful Japanese strategic thinkers who believed that the only way resource-poor Japan could win a war against the United States and Great Britain was by a quick and devastating surprise attack. Iguchi also documents contrary views held by influential Japanese leaders at the time who tried to halt the momentum for war.
Iguchi does not believe there was an American conspiracy to provoke war with Japan. He also rejects such myths as that Roosevelt knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack or that Churchill was responsible, meaning to draw the United States into war against Hitler.
The value of this book is in how candidly and accurately Iguchi documents the historical context for the Pacific War. He explains Japanese motives based on his unique personal experiences, reinforced by formerly classified internal Japanese records. There is no forgiving Japan's cowardly attack on Pearl Harbor, but there is much to admire about a senior Japanese diplomat who courageously does his best to set the record straight.
MYRON H. NORDQUIST

University of Virginia School of Law Charlottesville, Virginia
Thomas, Evan. The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898 . New York: Little, Brown, 2010 American journalist and historian Evan Thomas has once again proved why he is among the foremost modern scholars of American history, culture, and politics. The War Lovers is a captivating chronicle of war fever and calculated crisis manipulated by key leaders in the run-up to the twentieth century and culminating in the Spanish-American War. Thomas assembles a compelling historical record for the case that the war was a conflict of choice, shaped by powerful politicians and statesmen and exploited by a rabidly sensationalist newspaper editor. Reasons for their conduct abound, from simple machismo to earnest belief in the national interest, from greed to pure selfindulgence and an insatiable appetite for controversy. Thomas reveals an instructive case study for current military and civilian national security professionals on the causal factors for war and the agendas that influence national decision making. He weaves the archetypal cautionary tale, making clear that conflict is sometimes the product of irrational and intensely personal calculus rather than the pure strategic realpolitik taught in universities and the war colleges.
The author recasts the image of Theodore Roosevelt from that of the conventional wisdom-the loyal, altruistic model nationalist-to that of a sophistic, scheming demagogue willing to stage-manage U.S. foreign policy to his own egotistic ends and driven by psychological factors, including an extreme case of father worship. Roosevelt's self-loathing, in this view, was so complete that it transformed his outlook with absolute sincerity-introspection was not Roosevelt's strong suit. Similarly, Thomas paints the statesman and virtual New England hereditary peer Henry Cabot Lodge as a puppeteer, dancing marionettes across a stage to demonstrate his power and influence. William Randolph Hearst's legend as a muckraking proprietor of "journalism that acts" needs little exposition, but Thomas fleshes out his character with a healthy degree of cynicism and edgy historical humor. The author develops a plotline of interaction between these three principal actors and establishments -the Washington political establishment, embodied by Speaker Thomas Reed, the Boston Brahmin social establishment, and the Harvard set-showing the tensions and their resolutions in a way that makes the characters at once real, competent, ludicrous, vulnerable, haughty, adventurous, and patriotic.
Thomas himself is of relatively high birth, the son of a literary editor and grandson of a Princeton graduate and presidential candidate. Although educated at Phillips Andover, Harvard, and the University of Virginia's law school, he shows mercy in describing the conceit and self-importance of fellow Harvard men Roosevelt and Lodge.
The takeaway for this reviewer is that actors are more complex than the oversimplified caricatures that the modern press, the academy, and political society sometimes make them out to be. Roosevelt is often caricatured as a cigarchomping outdoorsman and man of adventure, leading from the front in the Cuban campaign and earning accolades and medals for altruistic heroism. In reality, the picture of Roosevelt painted by Thomas is of a man not nearly so selflessly patriotic and capable but rather of one who was willing to subordinate the national interest to his own ends.
Thomas shows that in similar circumstances about a hundred years ago, similar actors with analogous agendas acted in comparable ways, perhaps for similar purposes. The image of Teddy Roosevelt, the purest American loyalist, charging up San Juan Hill to liberate Cuba from the malicious Spanish regime is insufficient to capture the total picture of the complex political, military, and strategic confluence that led to the Spanish-American War. The question for the polity is how to design a system that marginalizes these personal agendas and ideologies to ensure that questions of war are indeed answered with morality, proper state behavior, and national self-interest as the foremost considerations. Books like The War Lovers are instructive in ensuring we are not doomed to repeat history, or at least that we can recognize it when we are. The Napoleonic Wars are not exceptions to the rule that the victor of war writes the history. Yet there is a strange omission: the mythic history of Napoleon and Russia has been produced almost wholly by the British and Germans and focuses on the events of 1813 and 1814. Yes, the disastrous French campaign in Russia is viewed as the beginning of the end and treated as Napoleon's mistake, but if the Russians are offhandedly thanked for the war of attrition they fought in 1812, their participation in Western Europe in 1813 and 1814 has been downplayed. This is despite the startling fact that 650,000 Russians operated in the West in those years and in fact trooped into Paris in March 1814.
LT. COL. ROBERT GRAY BRACKNELL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Kabul, Afghanistan
Even historians of Russia have not made much of the role the Russians played in 1813-14. They could not do so, of course, given the lack of archival access. But one must also consider the impact of the myth of 1812, promulgated in War and Peace and later reinforced by the "populism" of the Russian Revolution. Tolstoy's myth emphasizes weather, great distances, Napoleon's overconfidence, and especially the heroism of the long-suffering Russian people, who overcame not only the French but the incompetence of the tsar and his advisers and generals. All this resonated well with the subsequent need of nineteenth-century revolutionaries and Soviets to downplay the successes of the old regime. Dominic Lieven's Russia against Napoleon corrects the existing omission by bringing to light Russia's preparation for and the execution of its involvement in the diplomatic, political, and military struggle against Napoleon from the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 until 1814. If Lieven is to be congratulated for being the first to use Russian sources, available only since 1990, he deserves greater praise for resisting the urge to make his story part of the eventual fall of the tsarist regime. One could really not ask for more in the way of a military history. It is exhaustively thorough, cognizant of the relationships of intelligence, diplomacy, and domestic politics to war, and properly limited in scope and conclusions.
Lieven convincingly demonstrates the real accomplishments in terms of strategy and execution of war of Alexander I, his foreign-policy advisers, Count Nesselrode's Paris intelligence apparat, and military officers. His greater achievement, however, is his focus on logistics and-what might seem to be a minor matter-the role of the horse. These are perhaps the largest and most
